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IN THE SUPP.EME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 15432

-vsKARL J. STAVAR,
Defendant-Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMEllT
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S FOINT I
THE STATE HAS STANDING TO APPEAL IN THIS CASE
BECAUSE Atl ACTION TO REMOVE A PUBLIC OFFICIAL IS NOT A
"CRIMINAL ACTION.

II

State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12
(1961)

(hereinafter Geurts) is dispositive of this issue.

That case involved an appeal from a final judgment in a
removal proceeding brought under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1
et seq (1953), and this Court stated that "This proceeding
can properly be regarded as quasi-criminal."
added). 11 Utah 2d at 350, 359 P.2d at 16.

(Emphasis
In discussing

the applicability of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
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the removal proceeding, this Court held that "This proceeding can be nothing other than a
(~mphasis

proceeding.

~pecial

statutory

added), 11 Utah at 350, 359

at 17, and held that Rule Bl(a) governed the action,

P.~

rat~r

than Rule 81 (e), which would apply if the removal proceeding
were a "criminal proceeding."
This Court's decision in Geurts, that an action to
remove a public officer is not a criminal action, is consiste:
with the legislature's intent.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14

(1953) demonstrates that the legislature intended appeals
from judgnent in removal actions to be civil in nature where
it provides, "From a judgment of removal an appeal may be
taken to the Supreme Court in the same manner as from a judgment in a civil action.

" (Emphasis added). Even the

criminal code clearly states that removal from office is a
civil matter.
declares:

Utah Code Ann.

§

76-3-201 (2) (Supp. 1977)

"This chapter shall not deprive a court of authori:

conferred by law to .

.permit removal of a person from

office . • . or impose any other civil penalty."
In an earlier case, Skeen v. Craig, 31 Utah 20, 86
Pac. 487

(1906), this Court aligned itself with what it

termed "the great weight of authority"· and "the better reasoni
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cases," in expressly holding that judicial proceedings for
removal of officers were civil in nature.
488.

Id. 86 Pac. at

The Court considered the kind of judgment which may

result as dispositive, and finding that no fine or imprisonment could be imposed declared the removal proceeding

civil

in nature.
The

Guerts conclusion is also consistent with the

fundamental right of appellate review guaranteed by the Utah
Constitution.

Article VIII, Section 9 of our constitution

provides, "From all final judgments of the district court there
shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court."

In State

v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 91, 59 P. 553, 554 (1899),this Court
interpreted that constitutional provision as:
" . . . a plain and express provision
of the fundamental law which grants the
right of appeal 'from all final judgments
of the district courts.'
It is mandatory
and applies alike to criminal prosecutions
and civil actions.
.The State is not
made an exception • . ·" (Emphasis added,)
Respondent hopes to deny the State its right of
appeal in this action by citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4
(1953).

The scope of that statute is limited,

Utah Code Ann

§

77-39-1

(1953~

~owever,

by

which provides, "Either party

in a criminal action m~y . • . appeal to the Supreme Court as
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prescribed in this chapter."

(Emphasis added.) The State

submits that § 77-39-4, by its very terms, applies

only~

criminal actions and that a resoval proceeding is not a
criminal action as has been shown above.

The Geurts conclusion is also consistent with the

I

laws .of other jurisdictions which hold that a proceeding to
remove a public officer is not criminal in nature.

§_h~

v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association, 448 P.2d 301
(Okla. Jud. 1968) cert. denied 394 U.S. 904;
332 F. Supp. 608

I~eiser

v. Bel:

(E.D. Penn. 1971); McComb v. Commission

on Judicial Conduct, 138 Cal.Rpt:i: 459, 564 P.2d 1 ( 1977):
Archbold v. Huntingdon, 34 Idaho 558, 0201 Pac. 1041 (1921).
Appellant submits that a reraoval proceeding is r.c:
a criminal action, and that § 77-39-4 is not applicable.
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I

Respondent seeks to apply Section 77-39-4 to
a non-criminal action by relying on Hartman v. Weggeland,
19 Utah 2d 229, 429 P. 2d 978 (1957)

(hereinafter Hartr.lan).

Appellant submits that Hartman is of limited precedential
value, and, assuming it is a viable precedent, is inapplicable
to the case at bar.

First, in Hartman the State sought to

appeal an order of a district court that compelled discovery
in a criminal action (i.e., an action to prosecute a criminal
offense defined by Title 76 of the Utah Code, to which
criminal penalties attach).

Hartman is therefore distin-

guishable from the case at bar, which is an appeal from a
final judgment in a non-criminal removal proceeding.

Second,

the Hartman decision appears not to have been followed by
this Court.

In Van Darn v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977)

(hereinafter Van Darn), this Court allowed the State to appeal
a district court's dismissal of a petition for a writ of
mandamus that arose from the erroneous dismissal of a
criminal action.

The Van Darn case appears consistent with

the line of cases which allow the State to appeal in noncriminal actions which arise directly from criminal actions.
See, e.g., Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 Pac. 988 (1908),

-5-
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holding that the State may appeal from a judgment in a
habeas corpus action which collaterally attacks a criminal
judgment.

Appellant submits that Hartman has not been

followed by this Court, and is inapplicable to the case
at bar.

There is a potent policy consideration which
supports granting the State a right of review in this case.
If corruption in a county or district were to spread so as
to include judicial as well as other public officers, a
corrupt judge could protect his corrupt confederates by
dismissing any accusation brought against them.

If the

judge's dismissal is unappealable, the corrupt county syster
could become self-perpetuating.

Appeal is the only satis-

factory remedy, and the only satisfactory "correction of
any despotic or arbitrary dismissal of a case by a judge."
State v. Davenport, 30 Utah 2d 298, 300, 517 P.2d 544, 546
(1973)

(Crockett, J. dissenting).

Appellant urges this

Court to hold Section 77-39-4 inapplicable to removal
proceedings in order to protect the integrity of government.

One other consideration could make removal based
upon a criminal conviction impossible if the court held
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removal proceedings to be criminal.

Presently a person

may be removed for conviction of certain crimes {as well
as for malfeasance) according to removal statutes.

!f

removal is criminal, and a removal is attempted, based
upon a conviction and not upon malfeasance in office, then
the double jeopardy clause of the Utah State Constitution
would come into play, barring the second criminal action
(removal) against a defendant for the same conduct arising
out of a single criminal episode.

Removal based upon a

conviction might well be impossible iE removal is criminal.
This double jeopardy problem is one of the precise reasons
many courts have held removal proceedings not criminal.
Thurston v. Clark, 107 Cal. 285, 40 Pac. 435 (1895).

Accord,

Skeen v. Paine, 32 Utah 295, 90 Pac. 440 (1907); Law v.
Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98 Pac. 300 (1908).
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT II AND AJltICUS CURIAE
A co:NVICTION FOR A CRIME IS NOT A PRE,REQUISITE
TO INITIATION OF AN ACTION TO REMOVE A PUBLIC OFFICIAL,
ESPECIALLY \vHEN REMOVAL IS BASED UPON MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE.
The earlier pre-1967 removal statute was interpreted
by this Court in State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d
571 (1965), as requiring misconduct "in office" for removal
and leaving an official, guilty of crimes outside of office,
inunune from removal.

Thus, county auditor Jones who failed
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to file an income tax return while in office, was a pparent: I
sent to prison (see Representative Frost below) and yet

I

was held not subject to the removal action.

Responding

i

to this decision, Representative Frost of the Utah State

'

Legislature submitted a legislative amendment to the 1967
Legislature to "strengthen" this law.

Referring to

Respondent's exhibit, Transcript of Debate for Third
Reading House Bill No. 82:
"REPRESENTATIVE FROST: • • • I
would like to give you just a little
bit of background on this bill. It
came about through the --incident here
in Salt Lake County of Mr. Jones being
convicted and being sent to prison
while in office, and so I decided
that probably there was something that
needed to be done about the bill. I
read in the paper where the governor
and other officials said that the law
was not clear on cases like this and
that it should be cleared up, so I
asked, first before the session started,
I asked Mr. Lewis Lloyd from the
Legislative Council to research this
up a bit. I didn't ask him to prepare
a bill, but I asked his opinion on it
and he said yes, he concurred that the
law needed to be cleared up and
strengthened. When the session started
he did have a bill prepared for me on
this. • • I we.nt down to the Attorney
General's Office with it, and I also
asked that the reference if thev thought
that this law should be strenghened and
cleared up and thev said yes, very
definitely.
They had the opinion.also
that there should be a strengthening·
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lI
j

in this field, the law should be
clarified and strengthened."
Floor Debate on House Bill 82,
February 2, 1967.
Respondent admits that Representative Frost
sought to strengthen the removal statute to correct the
problem that arose because of State v. Jones, supra.

To

strengthen the law does not mean to narrow the scope and
effect of the statute.

In this case, it appears

Representative Frost wanted to broaden the removal
statute.

In other words, Representative Frost apparently

wanted to make an official who had committed wrongdoing
outside of office subject to removal as well as one who
had committed wrongdoing in office.
If respondent's interpretation of the removal
statute is followed, this intent to broaden the removal laws
and to create more responsibility in public office would be
thwarted.

If a public official must be convicted of a

crime before removal, then public officials who are not
performing their duties may well be immune from removal.
For example, the offense of official misconduct, Utah Code
Ann.

§

76-8-201 (1953), as amended, requires a specific

intent that the public official in his misconduct or
misfeasance have the intent "[t]o benefit himself or
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another or to harm another . •

If the nublic

official totally neglects his lawful duties and if he
does not act with the motive of benefitting himself or
another, he cannot be convicted, hence not removed from
office.

If he is corrupt for corruption sake and not

for benefit he is free so to be, and the public is
without protection.

Such a result is not "strengthening"

the law of malfeasance, but miserably emascultating it.
Such a result flies in the face of the legislative

in~~.

Even if some other statute might allow removal
of the corrupt officer by some other public officials
(such as a county commission)
fail to act, the public has no

if those other officials
protection, no speedy

removal.
Provisions in state constitutions and in
state statutes relating to the removal of public officials
are intended to provide a speedy remedy for the removal
of corrupt and unfaithful officials.

State v. Scarth,

151 Okl. 178, 3 P.2d 446 (1931); Com. ex rel. Davis v.
Malbon, 195 Va. 368, 78 S.E. 2d 683

(1953).

such provisions is based on public policy:

The reason for
specifically,

they are intended to protect the public interest.

-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Geurts,
supra, emphasized the underlying reasons for the expeditious nature of removal proceedings:
"From a survey of the chapter
(77-7 U.C.A. 1953) it appears that
the legislature thought the interests
of the public in combating corruption
in public office require an expeditious
procedure for the removal of pUblic
officers who betray their trusts.
Quite likely this is the reason why
no provision is made therein for a
preliminary hearing as is done for
felonies in the criminal code.
The need for reasonable expedition and the elimination of obstructing
or delaying tactics cannot be ignored."
Id., 359 P.2d at 16.
Requiring now, not only a possible preliminary
hearing, but a trial and a sentence, before proceedings
could be initiated and a trial held for removal, does
not comport with this intent and public interest.
Respondent places great weight on the statements
of two legislators in 1967.

However, it should be noted

that one of the two felt or desired that a person not be
removed unless a conviction for a felony prece~ed removal.
Representative Frost stated that "they have to be convicted
of a felony to begin with • • • • "
page 9.

Respondent's Brief at

Obviously and gratefully his desires in that

regard were not followed by the legislature.

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

When the criminal code was changed in 1973,
the legislature chose not to repeal the words "malfeasance
in office" in Utah Code Ann.

§

77-7-1 (1953), as amended,

even though a crime labelled "malfeasance in office" was
to be repealed.

Such action shows that the legislature

desired to allow removal for malfeasance in office even
though conviction for some crime so named would be impossibt
This later expression of legislative intent clearly shows
that respondent's analysis of the earlier, 1967, intent of
the legislature is either false, or superseded as of 1973,
Respondent requests this Court to assume that the
legislature did not know what it was doing when it failed
to repeal the words "malfeasance in office" in Section 77-7·
The assumption that a legislative body did not know what
they were doing is one of the most disfavored doctrines of
law.

The legislature should be presumed to be acting

responsibly and knowingly.
Great weight is given by respondent to have proof
beyond a reasonable doubt before any removal.

in State v. Geurts, supra, and State v. Jones, supra,
concluded the removal proceedings would require a burden of
proof as in a criminal action.

Thus, the burden of proofu

the protection to the public official is supplied by the
removal proceeding itself.

I

"'

i

This Court

-12-
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REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSATION
TOTALLY DEFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO SET FORTH FACTS WITH
SUFFICIEUT PARTICULARITY TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
Respondent relies almost exclusively on Burke v.
Knox, 59 Utah 596, 206 Pac. 711 (1922), which has been
superseded by the entire later body of law regarding
pleading and practice with respect to accusations.

See,

for example, the legislative history of Utah Code Ann. §§
77-11-1, 77-21-6, 77-21-7, and 77-21-8 (1953), as amended,
which statutes the State of Utah has relied upon in its
original brief.
CONCLUSION
The State of Utah may appeal from the dismissal of
the action to remove respondent from off ice because removal
is not a criminal action.

The legislature does not require

a conviction to precede the initiation of a proceeding to
remove.

To hold otherwise would be to presume that the

legislature used words and phrases inadvisedly, and desired
to emasculate the law of removal.

Pleading in this matter

was correct under currently applicable laws regarding accusations.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
ROBERT R. WALLACE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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